

# AFRO BAROMETER

Working Paper No. 61

## **Citizens and the State in Africa: New Results from Afrobarometer Round 3**

**A Compendium of Public Opinion Findings  
from 18 African Countries, 2005-2006**

by  
**The Afrobarometer Network**

Compilers: Carolyn Logan,  
Tetsuya Fujiwara and Virginia Parish

**A comparative series of national public  
attitude surveys on democracy, markets  
and civil society in Africa.**



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## AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

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Afrobarometer publications report the results of national sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets, civil society, and other aspects of development. The Afrobarometer is a collaborative enterprise of Michigan State University (MSU), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD, Ghana). Afrobarometer papers are simultaneously co-published by these partner institutions.


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# *Idasa*



# Citizens and the State in Africa: New Results from Afrobarometer Round 3

## **A Compendium of Public Opinion Findings from 18 African Countries, 2005-2006**

### *Abstract*

This compendium reports on the findings from new questions and topic areas explored in Round 3 of the Afrobarometer, involving public attitude surveys conducted in 18 countries from 2005-2006. The bulk of these new questions build upon the theme of citizen-state relations, exploring how well citizens know and understand their political system, how effectively the state is serving their most important needs, and how corruption shapes citizen assessments of state legitimacy. These findings have important implications for the consolidation of democracy. For example, we find that while Africans rate the quality of their elections relatively highly, the ability of elections to provide them with either a real voice in government, or an effective means for enforcing accountability on their representatives, remains much less certain. In addition, we find that while the state enjoys a considerable degree of legitimacy, and there is solid support for protection of individual freedoms and enforcement of the rule of law, there is also a sizeable and consistent minority that expresses willingness to compromise on these issues, either to protect the state, or to “get things done.” It appears that the public recognizes the need for citizens to be more critical of the state in principle, but does not always find itself able to fulfill this duty in practice.

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# Citizens and the State in Africa: New Results from Afrobarometer Round 3

## INTRODUCTION

### Afrobarometer Round 3

Since 1999, the Afrobarometer has been collecting data on the attitudes and behaviors of ordinary Africans in reforming polities and economies across the continent. One of the project's key goals has been to open a window onto how average citizens understand their political, social and economic milieu. While we have often had a great deal of information on the attitudes and behaviors of African elites, the orientations of the general public towards political and economic change have, to a considerable extent, been unknown, undervalued and ignored.

The Afrobarometer therefore seeks to reshape the debate on political and economic reform in Africa by giving voice to African citizens. Afrobarometer results enable Africans and interested outsiders to educate themselves about public opinion on the sub-Saharan sub-continent, and to influence policy makers accordingly. The project has devoted particular attention to exploring popular attitudes toward and assessments of democracy, and to public evaluations of economic reform programs.

Afrobarometer Round 1 explored these issues in 12 countries from 1999-2001 (Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Round 2 expanded the scope to four additional countries (Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique and Senegal) during 2002-2003. Round 3 of the Afrobarometer, conducted from 10 March 2005 to 7 March 2006, extends the reach of the project still further, now including 18 countries with the addition of Benin and Madagascar.

But the scope of the project has also been extended in another way. While a sizeable body of core questions concerning democracy, governance and the economy have been preserved through all three survey rounds, allowing an exploration of trends in public attitudes over time (see the companion compendium, released simultaneously with this report, entitled "Where is Africa Going? Views from Below," Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 60, available at [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)), the Round 3 survey instrument has also added new questions that allow us to delve into new topics, or to explore existing topics in greater detail. It is these new or expanded areas of enquiry that are the focus of this report.

The bulk of these new questions build upon the theme of citizen-state relations. How well do citizens know and understand the apparatus of the state and the governments that rule them? In liberalizing, electorally-driven political systems, how effectively do elections serve as a means of linking citizens more closely to the state, and playing a more hands-on role in their own governance? How do citizens assess the state's ability to help them meet their most pressing daily needs? Where does the public draw the line between the rights of the state to rule and enforce the law, and the rights of the citizen to enjoy basic freedoms? And to what extent is the widespread, and by many accounts escalating, problem of corruption likely to undermine citizens' respect for the legitimacy of the state?

## Key Findings

Before reviewing key findings, it is important to note that the 18 African countries included in the Afrobarometer are not fully representative of Africa as a whole. Having undergone a measure of political and economic reform, they are among the continent's most open regimes. However, the inclusion of countries with serious internal conflicts – like Nigeria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe – helps to make the country sample somewhat representative of the sub-continent. But considerable caution is nonetheless warranted when projecting Afrobarometer results to all “Africans.”

With this caution in mind, some of the most notable findings reported here include:

### ***On political knowledge:***

- The Africans we interviewed profess a great deal of interest in politics, but lack confidence in their own abilities to understand and influence what is going on. They nonetheless agree that citizens have an important role to play in questioning the actions of their leaders.
- Africans are relatively knowledgeable about government policies concerning healthcare and education that affect their daily lives. But a mere 14% understands that it is the courts that are responsible for protecting and enforcing the constitution by determining whether or not laws are constitutional.

### ***On elections and representation:***

- Most of the countries covered by the survey have achieved considerable success in terms of holding elections that the public views as credible, although Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe present some notable exceptions.
- African citizens are uncertain about the ability of elections to fulfill their intended roles of providing *voice* and *accountability* for the average citizen.
- Africans rate the behavior of campaigning politicians quite poorly, and believe that vote buying is extremely common, although relatively few have personally been offered such incentives.
- The quality of representation is low. Elected leaders get poor marks for interacting with their constituents once the elections are over.

### ***On social service delivery:***

- Although users of schools and clinics report encountering frequent problems, they nonetheless rate their governments quite highly for their performance in providing these vital services.
- While education and, to a lesser extent, health care services are relatively accessible to the public, obtaining identity documents, police assistance, and household services all present significant difficulties.

### ***On citizen rights and responsibilities and the rule of law:***

- Majorities support full protection of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of the press. But sizeable and consistent minorities are willing to limit civil liberties or suspend the rule of law in order to protect the state from criticism, or simply to “get things done.”
- In general, the public confirms the legitimacy of the state and supports its right to make and enforce decisions. But the public’s endorsement is by no means universal, and in a number of countries a significant minority remain unconvinced. Malawians in particular are seriously disaffected with the nation’s tax collectors, and may be headed toward a tax revolt.
- While almost all analysts point to the limited reach of the African state, the Africans we interviewed are confident that the state has the capacity to enforce the law against ordinary people like themselves. They lack confidence, however, in the willingness of political leaders to enforce the law against themselves; the public believes that the powerful and connected still enjoy special privileges even in a democratic system.

### ***On corruption:***

- Public understandings of what constitutes corruption in Africa are largely consistent with international definitions.
- The public perceives relatively high levels of corruption among public officials, with an average of nearly one-third (30%) saying that “most” or “all” officials engage in corrupt behavior. Police fare the worst, followed by tax collectors, while presidents and their staffs receive the most positive assessments.
- Reported, first-hand experiences of corruption in the last year are low relative to perceptions, although still high by international standards. On average, between 7 and 12 percent report first hand experience with corruption in various sectors in the past year. Kenyans and Nigerians, however, report a far higher incidence.
- At least in hypothetical confrontations with the state, significant numbers of Africans – a solid majority in most cases – say they will take action to try to change the system, rather than acquiescing to government failures and/or misrule. Threats to the family’s access to land are particularly likely to generate an aggressive response.

### **The Afrobarometer Network**

The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan research project that measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in sub-Saharan Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries can be systematically compared and trends can be tracked over time.

The Afrobarometer is dedicated to three main objectives:

- to produce scientifically reliable data on public opinion in Africa;



- to strengthen capacity for survey research in African institutions; and
- to broadly disseminate and apply survey results.

Afrobarometer results are used by decision-makers in government, non-governmental policy advocates, international donor agencies, journalists and academic researchers, as well as average Africans who wish to become informed and active citizens.

Because of its broad scope, the Afrobarometer is organized as an international collaborative enterprise. The Afrobarometer Network consists of three Core Partners who are jointly responsible for project leadership and coordination: the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana (CDD-Ghana), and Michigan State University (MSU). The Afrobarometer Network also includes National Partner institutions who conduct the surveys in each participating country. These include university research institutes, independent think tanks, or private polling firms.

## Caveats

**How valid and reliable** are the subjective views of ordinary citizens? On a continent where most people continue to live in rural areas and where a good education is hard to find, people may not be well enough informed to offer dependable opinions. Or so goes the argument. While education clearly improves a respondent's comprehension of survey questions and adds sophistication to answers, we nevertheless resist concluding that non-literate or parochial respondents lack the capacity to form opinions about livelihood and well-being. On the contrary, we have found that, as long as questions are stated plainly and concretely (all question wordings are provided in the text and tables that follow), Africans can express clear opinions about economic survival and political authority.

The reader will notice that public opinion often confirms, but sometimes contradicts, empirical observations of a more objective sort. For example, both Mali and Namibia earn a combined score of 4 on the Freedom House indices of political rights and civil liberties, earning both of them a designation as “free.”<sup>1</sup> Yet when we ask respondents in the two countries to rate the extent of their own democracy, confident Namibians give themselves the highest ranking among the 18 countries, with 73% rating the country as either a full democracy or a democracy with only minor problems, compared to just 57% of Malians who give their country a similarly positive review. Under these circumstances, how far can we trust public opinion?

We argue that, in the realms of society, politics and the economy, **perceptions matter just as much – if not more – than reality**. That which people think to be true – including judgments about present conditions or past performance and expectations for the future – is a central motivation for behavior. Perceptions are paramount in the interest-driven realm of the marketplace and the ideological realm of politics. Whether or not attitudes exactly mirror exterior circumstances, an individual's interior perspective forms the basis of any calculus for action. And, consistent with our instinct that all people, whatever their material circumstances, are capable of acute observation and rational thought, we find that, more often than not, public opinion findings reinforce, rather than undercut, the thrust of official aggregate statistics.

**Survey data, however, have multiple advantages.** They allow us to see where the general public is dissatisfied, thus calling into question the suitability of existing policies and suggesting

<sup>1</sup> See [www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf).

alternatives. They offer opportunities to break down official aggregates in order to discover who supports the *status quo* and who does not. Moreover, survey data provide new openings for testing and explaining observed differences across countries and time periods.

The purpose of this compendium, and its companion piece on trends in public opinion from 1999-2006, is to present “**just the facts.**” The tables that follow report simple descriptive statistics that summarize key public attitudes, both by country and for a mean of 18 Afrobarometer countries. The text does little more than draw the reader’s attention to the most salient findings. As such, this handbook aims primarily to create a record of mass attitudes on the topic of citizen-state relations. We have intentionally kept interpretation of results to a bare minimum. The explanation of the reasons underlying these findings is left largely to the reader, to other researchers, and to the members of the Afrobarometer Network who are already embarked on additional analysis.

For access to Afrobarometer publications, please visit [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org).

## **Technical Notes**

To comprehend and correctly interpret the text and tables of this report, the reader should bear in mind the following considerations:

### ***Sampling***

- Round 3 surveys were in the field from March 10, 2005 to March 7, 2006. The exact dates for each survey are presented in Appendix 1.
- In each country, the Afrobarometer covers a representative sample of the adult population (i.e., those over 18 years old and eligible to vote). Survey respondents are selected using a multistage, stratified, clustered area design that is randomized at every stage with probability proportional to population size. For fuller details see [www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html](http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html). Across 18 countries, a total of 25,397 respondents were interviewed. The sample size in each country is listed in Appendix 1.
- The minimum sample size in any country is generally 1200, which is sufficient to yield a confidence interval of plus or minus 3 percentage points (actually 2.8 percentage points) at a confidence level of 95 percent. Due to constraints on conducting fieldwork in Zimbabwe, the sample size there is somewhat less, with 1048 respondents. In three countries with sample sizes of approximately 2400 – Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda – the margin of sampling error decreases to plus or minus 2 percentage points.

### ***Fieldwork Methodology, Coverage, and Timing***

- Round 3 surveys used an identical survey instrument in all 18 countries. The base questionnaire was produced initially in English, and then translated into other national languages (French, Portuguese, and Swahili). The questionnaire is then “indigenized” in each country to adapt to local nomenclature and country-specific factors, after which it is translated into the primary local languages. Respondents are then interviewed by trained interviewers in face-to-face sessions, in the language of the respondent’s choice.

- The schedule of fieldwork can be found in Appendix A. Several points about the coverage and timing of specific surveys are worth noting:
  - In Ghana, the survey was conducted just a few months after that country’s December 2004 national election, which saw the re-election of President John Kufuor and the NPP.
  - In Kenya, the fieldwork was conducted just two months before the November 2005 national referendum on a new constitution put forward by the government, which was rejected.
  - In Nigeria, a number of areas had to be re-surveyed, resulting in a longer than usual window of four months from the start of fieldwork to its completion. The survey was conducted just as the battle about amending the constitution to allow President Obasanjo to seek a third term in office began heating up.
  - In Tanzania, fieldwork was completed just before the start of campaigning for the December 2005 national elections.
  - In Uganda, continuing political instability in the north once again necessitated the exclusion of a number of northern districts from the national sample. In addition, the survey was conducted shortly before the July 2005 referendum on multipartyism, and just as the debate about amending the Constitution to allow President Museveni to seek a third term – which he eventually won – was heating up.
  - In Zimbabwe, present political conditions make survey research a somewhat risky endeavor. A shortened survey instrument was used to expedite fieldwork. Even so, the survey was disrupted by unruly political elements affiliated with the ruling party, leading to early termination of fieldwork. As a result, our sample falls somewhat short in some provinces. In addition, the survey was conducted five months after the implementation of Operation Murambatsvina.(OM) by the Government of Zimbabwe, a state-sponsored campaign to stifle independent economic and political activity in the country’s urban areas that produced large scale population dislocations. It also took place shortly before the November national senate elections.

### ***Descriptive Statistics***

- Percentages reported in the tables reflect valid responses. Unless otherwise noted, “don’t know” responses are included, even if they are not shown. But missing data, refusals to answer, and cases where a question was not applicable are excluded from the calculations. Except where noted, the share of missing data is small and does not significantly change the sample size or confidence interval.
- All percentages have been rounded to whole numbers. This occasionally introduces small anomalies in which the sum of total reported responses does not equal 100 percent. An empty cell signifies that a particular question was not asked in given country in a given year.
- In many cases, we have combined response categories. For example, “satisfied” and “very satisfied” responses are added together and reported as a single figure. Rounding was applied only after response categories were aggregated.

- Generally, country samples are self-weighting. In some countries, however, statistical weights were used to adjust for purposive over-sampling of minorities or to correct for inadvertent deviations from the planned sample during fieldwork. The frequency distributions reported in the tables reflect these within-country weights. The exception is Zimbabwe, where the sample was not weighted to account for the under-sampling due to early termination of fieldwork.
- The 18 country data sets are pooled into overall Afrobarometer Round 3 data set (n=25,397). We report 18-country mean statistics in the last row of each table. These means include the within-country weights described above, plus an across-country weight to standardize the size of each national sample to n = 1200 respondents. That is, each country carries equal weight in the calculation of Afrobarometer means, regardless of its sample size or overall population.

The results that follow cover a selection of 89 variables out of a total of 237 items asked of respondents in Round 3. The focus has been on items that were new to the Afrobarometer during this survey, although there are some exceptions, which are noted in the text. The respondent's demographic characteristics are excluded, as are items about the interview and its context recorded by the interviewer (which increase the total number of Round 3 items to over 300). For coverage of trends in some of these other items across three rounds in the 12 countries that have been included in the Afrobarometer since Round 1, readers are directed to the companion compendium, released simultaneously with this report, entitled "**Where is Africa Going: Views from Below**" (Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 60). Results from Round 1 and Round 2 for a host of other items can be found in two previous compendia, "Afrobarometer Round 1: Compendium of Comparative Data from a Twelve-Nation Survey" (Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 11), and "Afrobarometer Round 2: Compendium of Comparative Results from a 15-Country Survey" (Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 34).

## PART ONE: African Citizens and their States: Are You Paying Attention?

### 1.1. Citizen Engagement: Interest and Efficacy

We begin with the question of how engaged Africans are with their political systems, and how well equipped they feel to be active citizens, making demands on the state, and holding it accountable for its performance. Note that these questions are not new in Afrobarometer Round 3, but they are included here because they help to set the stage for review of other new findings on citizen-state relations.

**An individual's professed "interest in politics" has proven to be a strong indicator of their level of political activity.** We therefore asked respondents how interested they are in public affairs. **The Africans we interviewed report quite high levels of political interest:** two-thirds (66%) of all respondents report that they are either "somewhat" or "very interested" in politics and government. Basotho (82%), Tanzanians (80%) and Namibians (77%) profess the highest levels of interest, while citizens of Cape Verde (48%) and Madagascar (50%) are the least engaged.

**Africans also like to discuss politics with their friends and families;** 68% claim to do so at least occasionally. Ugandans are the most talkative (83%), while we again find that respondents in Cape Verde (52%) and Madagascar (51%), joined by Malawians (53%), are most inclined to let others handle politics on their behalf.

Levels of interest in politics may be both a cause and an effect of each individual's sense of personal efficacy when it comes to interacting politically either with other citizens, or with state institutions. But despite being actively engaged in the discussion of public affairs, **many Africans lack confidence in their ability to understand and influence politics.** Fully two-thirds (65%) agree with the statement that "Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can't really understand what's going on." Ugandans have the greatest confidence in their ability to comprehend the workings of the political system, but even here, only 28% disagree with this statement, along with 27% of Namibians. Citizens of Benin, on the other hand, show the least self-confidence: a mere 5% disagree with this statement, compared to 77% who agree.

Respondents are somewhat more ambivalent on the question of their ability to shape or influence the opinions of those around them. A plurality (39%) feels that they do not have much influence on others, compared to 32% who feel that they do, and 29% who don't know or are non-committal. Again, Ugandans are the most likely to see themselves as opinion leaders (44% say others listen), followed closely by Tanzanians (41%).

But while they may lack confidence in their own abilities to understand and influence politics, **Africans nonetheless strongly agree that citizens need to be more involved in challenging the actions of their political leaders.** Fully three-quarters (74%) agree that citizens should question their leaders more, compared to just 23% who instead think that people need to show more deference to authorities. Tanzanians, Botswana and Senegalese respondents offer the strongest support for an independent-minded citizenry (80%, 77% and 77%, respectively). Cape Verde is a notable exception, however. Here, a slim majority (51%) thinks that it is respect for authority, not challenges to it, that is in short supply. Namibians (47% for more respect) and Malians (41%) are also more inclined than others to respect authority, but even so, majorities in these countries join their counterparts elsewhere in expressing the need to question their leaders more, not less.

**Table 1.1: Citizen Engagement: Interest and Efficacy**

	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
How interested would you say you are in public affairs.	61	73	49	71	67	82	49	74	69	66	77	59	71	61	80	74	56	57	66
	38	26	48	28	33	18	50	24	31	29	22	40	28	38	17	26	43	43	32
	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	2	0	5	1	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	1
When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters:	22	23	17	30	24	20	12	23	21	25	19	21	36	19	38	29	14	20	23
	46	39	35	45	48	52	39	30	44	43	51	56	38	46	36	54	57	52	45
	31	38	46	25	27	27	48	46	35	27	29	23	24	34	24	17	28	28	31
	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	6	1	0	2	1	3	0	1	0	1
Do you disagree or agree with the following statements:																			
Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can't really understand what's going on.	77	65	62	64	67	69	68	75	63	52	50	75	65	66	47	62	74	73	65
	8	9	7	8	11	5	12	3	11	9	19	11	6	14	12	8	9	8	9
	5	21	20	19	17	18	12	17	19	21	27	11	18	17	23	28	13	14	18
	10	5	11	8	5	8	9	5	7	18	4	3	11	4	17	2	4	5	8
As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbours do not listen to you. <sup>2</sup>	35	41	42	47	31	40	26	61	40	38	31	45	46	34	26	40	30	54	39
	20	22	13	17	24	19	24	7	16	13	30	20	10	28	16	13	28	11	18
	26	27	28	27	35	29	35	27	35	28	35	32	32	28	41	44	35	28	32
	19	10	17	9	10	12	15	6	8	22	4	4	12	10	17	3	7	7	11
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B (percent agree / strongly agree)																			
A. As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders. B. In our country these days, we should show more respect for authority. Do not agree with either Don't know	74	77	40	75	78	64	59	71	58	58	51	70	77	73	80	67	72	67	74
	23	20	51	23	18	34	34	27	41	34	47	28	18	23	17	32	26	29	23
	1	3	4	2	3	1	3	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	1	1	2	2	1
	1	1	5	1	1	0	4	1	0	6	1	0	4	2	1	0	0	2	1

<sup>2</sup> In Zambia, missing data on this question, which is excluded from the responses reported, totaled 2.1%.

## 1.2. Political and Policy Knowledge

So Africans are interested in politics, but how much do they actually know about the political world around them? How familiar are they with the people who rule them, the institutions through which they rule, and the government policies that affect their daily lives?

Across all countries, nearly half can name their local government councilor (46%), their MP or representative to the National Assembly (48%), and the Vice President (49%). However, **there are wide variations in familiarity with local and national leaders**. For example, three-quarters or more of the population know their MP in five countries (Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda), while less than one-quarter can name their representative in another six (Benin, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa). The same sorts of variations apply for the Vice President, and for local government councilors.

The **variations *within* countries between the public's familiarity with their local and national representatives reveals a great deal about the importance of local government *vis-à-vis* the national government**. In Mali, for example, a country that has significantly decentralized government functions, respondents are much more familiar with their local government councilors (68%) than with their representatives to the National Assembly (38%). The same applies in Benin and Senegal. In Ghana, Lesotho and Zambia, on the other hand, roughly two-thirds know who their national legislative representative is, but only about one-third can identify their local councilor. This suggests that local government structures are still very much second-class players in these countries.

**Levels of knowledge about political institutions are more mixed. While nearly two-thirds (63%) know which party has the most seats in parliament, well under half (44%) are aware of the legal limitations on presidential tenure in their countries**. Surprisingly, knowledge of term limits does not seem to be linked to whether or not a country has waged a political battle about extending them. In Uganda, where President Museveni recently won a hard-fought change in the constitution to extend term limits, just 40% could correctly identify the constitutional two-term limit that still prevailed at the time of the survey. In contrast, in Nigeria, where supporters of President Obasanjo recently lost this battle, 63% could correctly identify the present two-term limit. But the same holds true in Tanzania, where 60% are well informed on this issue despite the fact that President Mkapa made no effort to extend his tenure before stepping down last year after two terms in office.

Particularly troubling for the consolidation of a constitutionally based democracy is the fact that **a mere 14% understand how their country's constitution is enforced**. In eight countries, the proportion that could correctly identify "whose responsibility it is to determine whether or not a law is constitutional" fell in the single digits. And even among the most informed populaces, in Nigeria and South Africa, well under half could identify the courts as the correct answer.

Not surprisingly, **levels of knowledge are highest with respect to public policies that directly affect respondents' daily lives**. Nearly three-quarters could correctly identify whether or not their country has a policy of providing free primary education, and 62% are familiar with the national policy concerning payment for primary health care services.

**Table 1.2: Political and Policy Knowledge**

	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
Can you tell me the name of: <sup>3</sup>																			
Your Member of Parliament? <sup>4</sup>	21	77	24	67	86	69	51	74	38	15	31	23	23	1	75	74	63	-	48
Your [selected] local government councillor? <sup>5</sup>	51	70	14	30	58	33	67	43	65	33	4	34	59	14	69	70	35	-	46
The Vice President? <sup>6</sup>	3	86	24	69	76	25	18	43	41	27	78	89	36	57	42	48	76	-	49
Do you happen to know: <sup>7</sup>																			
Which political party has the most seats in the Parliament?	22	90	46	72	55	80	60	33	12	70	93	82	59	85	84	58	72	-	63
How many times someone can legally be elected President?	36	25	34	68	39	31	40	48	63	21	32	63	29	48	60	40	65	-	44
Whose responsibility it is to determine whether or not a law is constitutional? <sup>8</sup>	8	11	7	14	19	1	12	5	3	8	23	44	12	35	2	2	24	-	14
Can you tell me whether the [government of this country] has a policy to provide:																			
Free primary education, that is, parents do not have to pay school fees	51	74	38	68	94	98	72	90	71	73	29	70	69	76	87	91	85	-	73
Free health care at public clinics, that is, no fees for visits or medicine	31	71	32	27	64	96	43	88	75	57	30	72	77	85	65	62	75	-	62

<sup>3</sup> In Mozambique there was a substantial amount of missing data on this question, which has been excluded. It amounted to 9.4% for the MP, 8.4% for the local government councillor, and 9.3% for the Vice President.

<sup>4</sup> This question, and all others in these tables that refer to a member of parliament, was “indigenized” in each country. Thus, the question referred either to “your Member of Parliament” or to “your representative to the National Assembly,” as appropriate.

<sup>5</sup> This question, and all others in these tables referring to local government councillors, was also indigenized, referring to an specific and, to the extent possible, functionally equivalent (across countries) member of the local government, preferably an elected one. These included “local government councillors,” “district administrator,” “mayor of your commune,” and others. Responses reported exclude the 60% in Namibia who do not have local government.

<sup>6</sup> This question was also indigenized, and referred in various countries to “the vice (or deputy) president,” “the deputy prime minister,” “the speaker of the national assembly”, or other senior national political figures other than the president or prime minister.

<sup>7</sup> For the three parts of this question, missing data in Mozambique amounted to 4.3%, 7.8%, and 10.3%, respectively.

<sup>8</sup> Even this level of knowledge is achieved only after utilizing a “liberal” interpretation of a correct answer on this question, which accepted virtually any mention of the legal system (e.g., “courts,” “lawyers,” “judges,” etc.) as a correct response, given the sharp contrast with many of the other answers provided such as “the president,” “the parliament,” “the people,” etc.



## PART TWO: ELECTIONS: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE?

### 2.1. The Role of Elections

In a democracy, elections are meant to play a critical role in actively linking the citizen to the state. In principle, **elections give the average citizen a voice in government, and serve as a means for the public to hold their political leadership accountable.** How well do they play these roles in practice?

It appears that **elections still have a considerable way to go in filling these roles from the perspective of the average African.** A plurality (46%) agrees that elections function “well” or “very well” at ensuring that that national legislatures reflect the views of voters, but nearly as many (41%) disagree. Ghanaians, who have recently held another successful election and have witnessed real political turnover, have the highest level of faith in elections as a means to represent the true voice of the people in government (71%), followed by Namibians (67%) and Batswana (65%). On the other hand, citizens of Zambia (29%), Malawi (30%), Nigeria (30%) and Zimbabwe (31%) have become increasingly disenchanted with the power of the polling booth to make their voices heard and their demands felt in the halls of government.

The public holds similar views regarding the ability of elections to ensure accountability by allowing the public to vote out leaders with whom they are dissatisfied. Again, a plurality (47%) thinks they achieve this goal, but they only slightly outnumber the four in ten (40%) who think they fail. As before, Ghanaians and Batswana reveal the greatest confidence in the effectiveness of their votes, while Nigerians, Zambians and Zimbabweans show the least. Malawians, however, are more mixed – while they do not think elections do much to ensure that voters’ views are reflected in parliament (30%), they nonetheless do credit elections with providing voters some means for holding their leaders accountable (56%).

Moreover, **it is not clear that African voters perceive of elections as a means for holding their elected leaders accountable.** When asked who should be responsible for ensuring that, once elected, MPs do their jobs, just one in three (34%) assign this duty to the voters themselves, while a nearly equal number (33%) think that this responsibility lies with the president and executive branch. This suggests that many Africans either do not comprehend the principle of *vertical accountability* (i.e., that the people should police the institutions), or perhaps they simply have more confidence in *horizontal accountability* (i.e., that the institutions should police one another). There may also still be some political learning that needs to be undone in political systems where a great deal of power has historically been concentrated in the hands of the executive, who typically ran roughshod over rubber-stamp parliaments. Another 15% believe the parliamentarians should essentially be self-policing, and 8 percent think their political parties are responsible.

Again, there are large variations across countries. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of respondents in Madagascar, and three-quarters of Malawians, recognize this important role of the voters. But **less than 10% of Cape Verdians, Mozambicans and Namibians think that enforcing accountability lies in their own hands.**

The pattern is similar with respect to local government councilors, although a somewhat larger share (40%) assign responsibility to the voters themselves. But one in five (22%) think that the local council is responsible for ensuring good performance from councilors, and nearly as many (19%) again think this is the president’s job.

**Table 2.1: The Role of Elections**

Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do elections:		BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
Ensure that the members of Parliament reflect the views of voters.	Well / Very well	50	65	41	71	43	43	41	30	50	56	67	30	40	49	41	56	29	31	46
	Not very well / Not at all well	26	31	28	19	45	42	48	63	41	21	27	64	36	36	39	40	60	67	41
	Don't know	23	4	31	10	12	15	11	7	9	24	7	6	23	15	20	4	11	2	13
Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want.	Well / Very well	46	65	51	79	39	43	54	56	45	48	59	26	55	39	37	49	29	33	47
	Not very well / Not at all well	29	31	23	13	49	37	35	37	47	25	34	68	23	46	42	46	61	65	40
	Don't know	24	5	26	8	12	21	11	7	8	28	7	6	22	15	20	5	10	2	13
Who should be responsible for:																				
Making sure that, once elected, members of Parliament do their jobs?	The President / Executive	17	38	43	39	27	62	14	12	29	46	48	37	23	44	22	30	33	32	33
	The Parliament / National Assembly	13	11	16	18	15	9	8	5	24	21	23	22	15	20	23	17	12	8	15
	Their Political Party	9	5	10	5	3	3	6	4	4	13	10	12	4	14	11	2	4	6	8
	The Voters	39	42	8	28	45	20	65	74	24	8	6	18	40	11	35	48	48	52	34
	Don't know	22	4	23	10	10	6	7	5	10	15	7	11	19	12	10	3	3	2	10
Making sure that, once elected, local government councillors do their jobs?	The President / Executive	8	17	32	14	10	30	9	10	13	39	24	23	17	28	8	14	20	24	19
	The Local Council	13	29	26	38	27	24	7	6	29	21	39	28	15	26	18	20	15	14	22
	Their Political Party	7	4	12	3	5	7	4	3	15	11	19	16	4	19	17	2	8	6	9
	The Voters	55	46	5	38	48	31	74	76	34	10	11	23	44	17	46	61	54	55	40
	Don't know	18	4	25	8	9	9	5	6	9	18	7	10	19	11	11	3	4	2	10

## 2.2. The Quality of Elections

Elections can only serve as an effective tool for holding leaders accountable if they are credible, and election outcomes are actually a fair representation of the people's wishes. To what extent has the legacy of rigging and manipulation of elections been overcome in these African states?

Overall, it appears that **these African countries have achieved notable success in terms of holding credible elections**. Two-thirds (66%) of all respondents believe that their country's most recent national election was either "completely free and fair," or "free and fair, but with minor problems." Three-quarters or more of the population feels this way in fully 11 of the 18 countries – a considerable achievement, particularly given the troubled electoral histories of many of these countries. **In a handful of countries, however, the story is much different.** In Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe, majorities believe that the most recent election was either "not free and fair," or "free and fair but with major problems." Notably, these are the same countries where citizens expressed the least confidence in the ability of elections to provide the people a real voice in government (see the previous section). Zambians are the most concerned: just 29% rate the country's most recent national election as credible.

What about the behavior of individual politicians during the campaign cycle? Are they – and their inevitable promises – credible? Does their campaign rhetoric bear a recognizable relationship to post-election reality?

Generally speaking, **Africans are relatively unimpressed with the behavior of their political leaders while on the campaign trail**. Fully 87% think that politicians "often" or "always" make campaign promises simply to get elected – a finding that holds relatively strongly across all countries (ranging from 73% in Mozambique, to 96% in Benin and Zambia). Yet 82% think that elected leaders "rarely" or "never" keep their campaign promises once elected. But these leaders don't only fail at delivering on their campaign promises. A roughly equal share (81%) do not think that politicians even try to meet the considerably lower bar of "doing their best to deliver development after elections."

So why do voters vote for candidates who offer so little to their constituents? Does the oft-cited offer of election "incentives" drive voter decisions? Certainly Africans themselves seem to perceive this to be true. **More than two-thirds (69%) believe that politicians offer "gifts" to voters during election campaigns "often" or "always."** In Kenya and Zambia, more than 90% of respondents believe such behavior is the norm. Only in Namibia does the slimmest of majorities (51%) think that such gift-giving is relatively uncommon in the campaign arena.

**However, when we compare these perceptions with respondents' own experiences, the breadth of the gap is quite striking.** While two-thirds believe that offering election incentives is commonplace, a mere 17% were actually offered such gifts themselves during the last campaign. A third or more of voters in Benin (34%), Kenya (42%), Madagascar (33%) and Uganda (36%) were offered "something, like food or a gift, in return for your vote." But in seven countries the numbers who personally experienced such vote-buying efforts were in the single digits.

**Table 2.2: The Quality of Elections**

	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [2001] <sup>9</sup>	75	84	56	77	79	79	78	43	64	77	77	32	78	75	79	67	29	36	66
	19	10	20	17	15	11	12	51	27	14	16	61	9	18	4	26	56	58	25
	7	6	24	6	6	11	10	6	9	10	6	7	13	7	17	7	16	6	10
In your opinion, how often do politicians do each of the following?																			
	96	80	86	90	95	87	84	80	91	73	76	88	93	86	77	95	96	94	87
	3	19	6	8	4	11	14	18	8	21	21	11	3	11	19	4	3	5	11
Keep their campaign promises after elections	1	1	8	2	1	2	1	2	2	5	2	1	4	3	4	0	0	0	2
	3	17	13	15	6	12	10	7	12	34	38	22	12	25	12	16	8	8	15
	95	81	78	82	92	86	88	92	85	58	60	77	83	71	82	83	91	91	82
Do their best to deliver development after elections	2	2	9	3	1	2	2	2	3	8	3	1	5	4	6	1	1	0	3
	7	13	13	17	7	13	11	8	18	29	38	19	15	26	13	17	10	8	15
	89	86	76	79	91	85	86	91	80	60	60	80	79	70	79	82	89	92	81
Offer gifts to voters during election campaigns	4	2	11	5	2	2	3	2	3	11	2	1	7	4	9	1	1	0	4
	84	52	72	68	94	40	64	69	83	61	41	84	79	46	48	85	93	83	69
	15	42	16	27	5	47	34	29	15	33	51	15	14	40	43	15	6	17	26
During the [2001] election, how often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift, in return for your vote?	1	6	13	5	1	13	3	2	2	7	8	1	7	13	9	1	1	1	5
	66	98	94	87	57	98	65	90	71	87	91	72	91	94	92	65	76	83	82
	12	1	3	3	15	1	14	4	9	3	5	13	2	2	4	13	11	7	7
	22	1	2	9	27	1	19	6	20	7	4	13	5	3	3	23	12	10	10
	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	4	1	3	2	1	2	0	1	0	1

<sup>9</sup> This question was asked in Round 1, but not in Round 2. On this question and the last one on the table, the year of the most recent national election was inserted in each country.

### 2.3. The Quality of Representation

We now return to the question of voice. To what extent do elected leaders serve as the voice of their constituents in government? Do they listen to them? Do they represent their views? Or do they primarily serve their own interests?

To begin with, we first ask how respondents view the *proper* role of an elected representative. Do they believe that their leaders must listen to constituents and do what they demand, or that, once elected, leaders are free to follow their own ideas? **An overwhelming 82% believe that their leaders *should* be listening to and representing their constituents' views, not their own,** compared to just 14% who think they should be free to “follow their own ideas in deciding what is best for the country.” Namibians appear to be the most deferential to their elected leaders, but even there, a solid majority of 59% thinks it is the public's views, not the representative's, that should guide their elected leaders.

**But it appears that what the public thinks representatives should do, and what they do do, are two very different things.** Just 23% believe that their representatives to the national legislature “often” or “always” listen to what average people have to say, compared to two-thirds (66%) who believe they do so “never” or “only sometimes.” And local government councilors fare only slightly better: 32% think they often or always listen to constituents, while 58% think this is an uncommon occurrence. **Only in Tanzania do majorities (53% and 68%) feel satisfied that their national and local representatives are paying attention to them,** accompanied by a slim plurality of Namibians who think representatives to the National Assembly are listening. In contrast, more than three-quarters in Kenya (82%), Madagascar (77%), Uganda (77%), Zambia (81%) and Zimbabwe (77%) feel largely ignored by the representatives who are supposed to be their voice in the halls of state power.

It is perhaps not surprising that respondents do not feel they are listened to, when in fact most of them enjoy only occasional visits from their representatives. When asked how much time representatives to the national legislature *should* spend in their constituencies, a solid plurality (46%) believes that visits “once a month” would be appropriate, while another 30% think they should be visiting even more often.

But in practice, **fully one in three respondents (35%) report that their representatives *never* visit, and another 21% say they do so only once per year.** Just 26% say they see their representatives in the home district once a month or more, producing a **50-point gap between expectations and reality** (76% who say they *should* come once a month or more, vs. 26% who say they *do* come once a month or more). Representatives are least inclined to mingle with their constituents in Benin – where fully 70% report that their representative *never* visits – and Madagascar, the two countries that also had the lowest expectations (53% and 59%, respectively, expect visits once per month or more). Botswana and Namibians are, in contrast, the best served – in both countries, 50% report visits at least once per month. The *gap* between expectations and realities is widest in Malawi (65 points), Zambia (65 points) and Zimbabwe (67 points) – particularly high expectations of elected leaders in these countries are (mis)matched by particularly low performance on the part of MPs.

**Table 2.3: The Quality of Representation**

	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. (percent agree / strongly agree)																			
A. Our elected officials should listen to constituents' views and do what they demand.	81	84	66	89	95	91	91	82	81	72	59	77	87	76	89	91	89	-	82
B. Our elected leaders should follow their own ideas in deciding what is best for the country.	18	15	24	6	4	8	7	16	18	19	36	20	9	15	8	8	9	-	14
Do not agree with either	1	1	4	3	1	0	1	1	1	3	3	2	2	5	1	0	1	-	2
Don't know	0	0	6	2	0	1	1	1	0	6	2	1	3	4	2	0	1	-	2
How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say?																			
Members of Parliament	17	30	13	26	13	17	17	23	27	28	46	16	19	22	53	19	10	21	23
Never / Only sometimes	69	65	69	62	82	71	77	73	61	54	45	72	62	60	37	77	81	77	66
Don't know	14	5	18	12	5	13	6	4	12	18	9	12	19	18	10	4	9	2	11
Elected Local Government Councillors	35	36	15	36	22	27	34	27	53	32	44	21	31	20	68	40	15	27	32
Never / Only sometimes	60	59	65	55	73	49	61	66	41	48	49	69	52	69	25	58	76	72	58
Don't know	5	5	21	9	5	24	5	7	6	21	8	11	18	11	7	2	10	1	10
How much time should your Member of Parliament spend in this constituency to visit the community and its citizens? <sup>10</sup>	2	16	8	4	8	10	4	26	19	12	16	7	14	13	16	3	23	24	12
Should stay here all of the time	9	19	23	12	30	19	8	27	11	18	29	26	19	14	11	14	19	17	18
At least weekly	42	57	49	59	50	57	47	41	42	37	40	34	35	32	46	62	48	47	46
At least once a month	39	5	9	15	8	4	37	3	19	17	7	12	13	13	19	17	4	6	14
At least once a year	4	0	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	1	4	2	8	1	2	1	2	3
Never / It is not necessary	5	3	9	7	2	8	2	3	7	14	7	18	17	21	7	2	5	4	8
Don't know	0	3	1	1	1	4	1	5	4	3	9	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	3
How much time does your Member of Parliament spend in this constituency?	1	8	5	7	5	5	1	5	4	8	15	11	5	6	2	4	4	3	5
At least weekly	6	39	15	25	26	26	7	18	13	15	26	19	9	15	15	19	18	17	18
At least once a month	15	19	20	17	32	28	36	12	24	17	18	12	10	13	39	29	17	25	21
At least once a year	70	17	41	32	26	20	48	56	35	36	19	25	36	29	32	40	30	40	35
Never	9	15	18	17	9	18	6	5	19	20	13	31	37	34	9	8	29	15	17
Don't know																			

<sup>10</sup> For countries with proportional representation systems, this question and the following one were modified to ask how much time representatives should (or do) spend "visiting communities and citizens."

## PART THREE: The State as Provider: Are You Being Served?

### 3.1. Social Services: Education

Voting for candidates, securing a “voice” in the halls of government, and holding leadership accountable are all fairly abstract aspects of the relationship between citizens and the state. This relationship becomes much more concrete in the continent’s overflowing schoolrooms. As elsewhere, obtaining an education for their children is one of the highest priorities of African parents. How well do they feel they are being served by their governments when it comes to the provision of this most critical of public goods?

**Overall, the answer seems to be: relatively well. Two-thirds (67%) of respondents say that their governments are doing “fairly well” or “very well” at addressing their country’s educational needs.** An overwhelming 92% of Basotho are happy with their government’s efforts to educate their children, as are 85% of Kenyans and Tanzanians, and 82% of Batswana. On the other hand, in a handful of countries, less than half of respondents give their governments passing marks, including Benin (49%), Malawi (46%), and Zimbabwe (45%), and in Nigeria only about one in three (36%) approves of the government’s efforts.

What specific problems do parents most often encounter in their children’s schools? About one-third of all respondents had not had any experience with schools in the preceding year (these figures are not reported in the table). But among those who did, **the most common problem cited was classroom overcrowding.** Thirty percent had encountered this problem “a few times” or “often,” and another 8% had faced it at least occasionally. But other problems were almost as common. Roughly one-third had at least occasionally experienced: poor conditions of school facilities (34%), absent teachers (34%), poor teaching (32%), lack of textbooks and supplies (39%), and unmanageable fees and expenses (32%). **Demands for illegal payments are a much less frequent problem:** only 17% of respondents had faced such requests in the previous year.

Consistent with their high ratings of government performance in this sector, Basotho report considerably fewer encounters with these problems than respondents in most other countries. A majority “never” experienced any of these problems during the past year. Whether this is because government performance is better than elsewhere, or because public expectations are lower, is not clear, but it is at the least surprising to see this deeply impoverished nation achieving some of the highest performance ratings. Batswana are nearly as complementary, and Malians also generally report fewer problems than others, though overcrowded classrooms are a problem there. On the other hand, respondents in Benin, Malawi, Zambia and especially Zimbabwe report more frequent shortfalls. In Zimbabwe, 72% say they have encountered lack of textbooks or other supplies at least occasionally (and 63% faced shortages a few times or often), 68% have found services too expensive, and 50% have noted teacher absence as a problem. In sharp contrast, however, Zimbabweans face fewer demands for illegal payments than others. Fully 60% never encountered such demands – along with 63% in Lesotho, 61% in Mali, and 74% in Botswana – compared to just 14% who did. On the other hand, nearly one-third (31%) of Namibians have faced these illegal requests, as have 29% of Nigerians.

These same two countries give the worst corruption ratings to their teachers and school administrators. Thirty-three percent of Namibians, and 36% of Nigerians, believe that “most” or “all” teachers and school administrators in their country are corrupt. In contrast, in Zimbabwe just one-third this number (12%) think the problem is this widespread in their country, and in several other countries (Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar and Tanzania) less than 10% think that the educational system faces widespread corruption problems.

**Table 3.1: Social Services: Education**

How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
Addressing educational needs	49	82	62	70	85	92	79	46	71	71	71	36	66	71	85	75	59	45	67
	48	17	22	27	14	7	16	49	27	23	27	63	29	27	12	24	40	54	29
	3	1	16	3	1	0	5	5	2	6	2	1	6	3	4	1	2	1	3
Have you encountered any of these problems with your local public schools during the past 12 months?																			
Services are too expensive / unable to pay	26	65	33	33	33	53	42	37	55	56	28	26	37	42	50	42	9	8	38
	19	12	6	11	15	9	6	6	10	10	22	17	8	10	8	12	19	12	12
	31	5	16	25	16	8	9	29	15	17	24	12	33	13	12	18	25	56	20
Lack of textbooks or other supplies	24	51	26	27	28	51	28	27	44	42	25	20	27	33	37	33	6	4	29
	15	17	5	10	14	11	8	5	12	13	21	15	10	14	10	9	14	9	12
	33	12	22	30	21	8	18	40	21	27	27	20	40	16	21	29	33	63	27
Poor teaching	22	49	34	34	26	57	33	30	46	41	31	18	39	39	37	29	7	26	33
	10	18	4	8	13	6	8	4	6	9	17	14	6	11	5	9	14	18	10
	34	13	15	21	22	5	12	37	22	26	23	22	26	11	21	34	30	28	22
Absent teachers	26	49	35	34	29	55	29	32	48	39	31	18	34	34	33	29	8	23	32
	16	17	5	10	14	6	11	5	8	12	16	16	9	13	6	10	14	21	12
	28	14	11	21	18	6	15	33	20	29	24	21	30	13	27	32	31	29	22
Overcrowded classrooms	16	52	29	35	18	58	25	27	30	30	25	16	27	29	35	19	11	32	29
	11	12	3	6	7	3	5	3	8	8	17	12	6	10	6	5	9	12	8
	44	16	18	23	37	6	23	42	37	41	30	26	38	23	25	48	32	29	30
Poor conditions of facilities	22	60	33	32	21	60	29	26	50	34	28	15	30	28	44	29	6	32	32
	13	9	4	8	10	2	8	3	5	6	16	12	5	11	7	10	11	16	9
	34	12	14	26	30	4	16	40	19	39	28	27	36	23	16	32	35	27	25
Demands for illegal payments	44	74	36	47	44	63	45	48	61	57	40	24	54	50	56	48	31	60	49
	8	2	2	4	9	2	3	3	5	6	11	12	5	5	5	9	11	6	6
	19	4	7	12	10	4	2	17	10	16	20	17	13	7	6	15	11	8	11
How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?																			
Teachers and school administrators	65	74	30	72	83	77	80	61	71	56	59	61	59	69	65	80	74	83	68
	18	12	6	15	9	8	5	15	19	27	33	36	12	19	7	14	21	12	16
	17	14	64	14	8	15	15	24	10	17	8	3	30	12	28	6	5	5	16



### 3.2. Social Services: Health

The connection between the citizen and the state is also made sharply concrete in the health care sector. How effectively are African governments meeting the public's essential needs for health care services for themselves and their families?

Once again, the overall rating is fairly positive. As with education, **nearly two-thirds (64%) of respondents say their government is doing “fairly well” or “very well” when it comes to improving basic health services.** Most satisfied are citizens of Botswana, where fully 84% give their government high marks. And three-quarters of those in Madagascar (76%), Mali (75%), and Uganda (75%) have similarly positive views of their governments' efforts. Nigeria (42%) and Zimbabwe (32%) once again bring up the rear.

**Long waits are the most common problem encountered** at local clinics and hospitals. Fully 61% had experienced this problem in the past year, and 47% waited “a few times” or “often.”<sup>11</sup> Eighty-four percent of Zimbabweans have encountered long waits, as have more than 70% of Kenyans, Malawians, Namibians, Senegalese and Ugandans. Lack of medicines or medical supplies was also a frequent complaint. Fifty-six percent had faced shortages, including 89% of Zimbabweans, and 70% or more of Kenyans, Malawians and Ugandans. Malians face the fewest shortages: 53% had never encountered lack of medicines or supplies.

Respondents also struggled to obtain quality health care services due to absent doctors (45%), lack of attention or respect from staff (45%), and high fees (43%). Two-thirds of Malians never encountered absent or disrespectful staff, but two-thirds of Zimbabweans found doctors absent “a few times” or “often.” **Zimbabwe's health care system may be approaching a state of crisis.**

Less common were encounters with dirty facilities (29%), and demands for illegal payments (21%). As before, bribery demands are the one problem that Zimbabweans face less frequently than others – just 16% had encountered requests for “gifts” in exchange for treatment or medicines, compared to 42% of Ugandans. Overall, **health workers are regarded as relatively honest by much of the public.** As with teachers, nearly two-thirds (64%) believe that none or only some health workers are involved in corruption, compared to 20% who think most or all of them are. Once again, Nigerians and Namibians give these civil servants the worst ratings, with roughly one-third saying that most or all of them are corrupt.

It is easy to see how Zimbabweans arrive at their negative ratings of overall government efforts in the health sector. **But in several other countries, there seems to be a disconnect between highly positive ratings of government performance, and frequent reports of problems encountered in the health care system.** For example, despite experiencing several of these problems at higher rates than many of their counterparts elsewhere, Ugandans nonetheless give their government one of the highest positive ratings for its handling of health care services (75% positive). And Botswana give their government's efforts the highest positive rating despite the fact that more than half have experienced long waits, absent doctors, and lack of medicines or supplies in the past year. It may be that despite the frequent problems encountered, the present provision of health services nonetheless represents an improvement – perhaps a large one – on past performance.

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<sup>11</sup> About 20% said they had no experience with clinics or hospitals in the past year. These figures, and those for respondents who said “don't know,” are not shown in the table.

**Table 3.2: Social Services: Health**

How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?		BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
Improving basic health services	Fairly / very well	59	84	53	73	69	57	76	53	75	70	73	42	63	64	70	75	60	32	64
	Fairly / very badly	40	15	32	24	30	41	20	43	24	25	26	58	33	34	27	25	38	67	33
	Don't know	1	1	16	3	1	2	4	5	1	5	1	1	4	2	3	0	1	1	3
Have you encountered any of these problems with your local public clinic or hospital during the past 12 months?																				
Services are too expensive / unable to pay	Never	27	82	37	31	29	67	41	41	52	58	37	26	29	56	50	47	11	13	41
	Once or twice	21	9	7	14	24	9	13	6	13	11	22	22	11	8	15	17	24	15	14
	A few times / often	46	4	25	29	34	9	27	41	30	20	28	17	55	11	27	24	32	66	29
Lack of medicines or other supplies	Never	42	38	31	36	14	31	32	18	53	35	30	22	27	30	34	15	6	5	28
	Once or twice	17	29	9	12	20	18	16	8	13	16	25	19	10	19	13	13	20	10	16
	A few times / often	30	29	29	24	51	35	31	62	27	39	32	24	57	26	46	61	42	79	40
Lack of attention or respect from staff	Never	42	49	42	38	34	52	55	27	67	41	31	23	53	28	52	31	14	24	39
	Once or twice	19	22	8	10	17	13	11	7	8	13	23	18	7	17	14	16	21	27	15
	A few times / often	29	24	20	24	35	20	13	55	18	36	32	23	34	29	27	41	32	44	30
Absent doctors	Never	57	42	45	39	33	49	45	41	66	41	35	20	46	28	48	33	9	12	38
	Once or twice	16	22	7	12	19	14	14	7	10	11	18	21	11	18	12	17	21	13	15
	A few times / often	16	32	13	20	33	20	20	36	17	33	33	24	36	27	32	38	37	69	30
Long waiting time	Never	40	33	24	23	15	26	40	17	44	25	15	17	20	14	31	17	5	10	23
	Once or twice	19	16	9	11	13	14	17	6	14	10	21	18	8	13	13	11	15	21	14
	A few times / often	31	47	38	37	58	46	23	66	36	54	51	30	66	47	49	61	47	63	47
Dirty facilities	Never	63	80	61	53	47	67	63	51	72	46	37	29	60	42	63	57	21	55	54
	Once or twice	13	8	3	5	14	7	9	5	5	9	18	17	6	13	10	14	19	23	11
	A few times / often	13	8	6	11	24	11	7	29	16	31	30	17	25	18	19	17	26	16	18
Demands for illegal payments	Never	65	91	46	55	51	82	61	54	74	59	50	35	65	61	62	46	46	77	60
	Once or twice	8	2	3	5	13	1	6	4	5	7	14	13	4	5	9	13	10	7	7
	A few times / often	16	3	8	9	22	1	9	23	13	21	19	16	19	6	21	29	11	9	14
How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?																				
Health workers	None / Some of them	59	73	29	69	72	68	75	53	68	56	60	65	56	64	58	68	80	78	64
	Most / All of them	25	12	6	17	20	18	12	24	25	27	32	32	17	25	19	27	14	17	20
	Don't Know	16	15	65	14	8	15	13	23	8	17	8	3	27	12	23	5	6	5	16

### 3.3. Access to Government Services

We have seen that despite frequent weaknesses in the provision of health and education services, African publics are fairly generous in their assessments of government performance. But how easy is it to attain access to these services, and how do they compare to other critical services provided by government?

We asked respondents about their access to five different services, from getting a child into primary school, to obtaining help from the police when they needed it. **Consistent with the generally positive ratings of the governments' efforts to provide for educational needs, we find that two-thirds (66%) of respondents say that getting a child into primary school is "easy" or "very easy,"** compared to less than one in five (18%) who say it is "difficult" or "very difficult." Significant majorities say it is easy in every country except Namibia (42%), Nigeria (41%), and Benin, where only a slim majority says it is easy (53%).

**Medical treatment presents somewhat greater hurdles.** A majority (58%) find it easy to obtain health care services, but more than one-third (38%) feels otherwise. The problems of high costs, long waits, and absent doctors discussed above all add up to more restricted access to this service.

Still greater problems impede Africans' ability to obtain government identity documents. **Respondents are evenly split on whether this process is easy (44%) or difficult (44%).** In this case, **cross-country variations are substantial.** More than three-quarters (77%) of citizens in Botswana and Cape Verde can readily obtain these documents, while an equal share of Basotho find the process difficult to navigate.

**Getting assistance from the police is an even more challenging task:** 45% find it difficult, compared to 34% who find it easy. Kenyans face especially high hurdles when it comes to getting assistance from their notoriously corrupt police force (65% difficult), while Botswana find their police to be the most readily accessible (58% easy). But even in Botswana, 41% find it difficult, so there is still much room for improvement here as well.

**Obtaining household services presents the greatest difficulties.** Nearly half (47%) of respondents find themselves facing roadblocks of many sorts that interfere with their efforts to obtain water supply, electricity, phone or other services in their homes. Tanzanians face the greatest obstacles: 69% say the process is difficult or very difficult. But in South Africa, although the post-apartheid government has been unable to meet its initial targets for extending service delivery to the under-served majority, the government has nonetheless succeeded in fostering a perception that services are relatively accessible for the majority: 58% report that it is easy to obtain household services, although one in three (33%) still finds the effort to be difficult.

**Table 3.3: Access to Government Services**

Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? <sup>12</sup>		BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
A place in primary school for a child	Easy / Very Easy	53	84	68	60	71	82	69	76	70	63	42	41	65	69	82	75	60	65	66
	Difficult / Very Difficult	26	11	14	20	14	8	13	9	14	26	42	31	23	12	10	10	24	16	18
	Never Try	19	2	13	17	11	8	15	15	14	7	14	26	8	13	1	14	13	13	12
	Don't Know	2	3	5	3	4	2	3	1	2	4	2	2	4	6	8	1	2	6	3
Medical treatment at a nearby clinic	Easy / Very Easy	50	85	49	46	58	72	62	59	65	50	57	43	45	60	61	52	50	40	56
	Difficult / Very Difficult	43	13	44	41	40	26	31	33	30	44	40	39	52	29	36	42	45	57	38
	Never Try	6	1	2	11	1	1	6	7	4	3	2	17	3	9	0	5	5	2	5
	Don't Know	1	0	5	2	1	0	1	1	1	4	0	1	1	2	2	0	0	1	1
An identity document (such as a birth certificate, driver's license, passport or voter card)	Easy / Very Easy	32	77	77	43	31	15	71	17	61	39	41	31	54	67	25	46	43	28	44
	Difficult / Very Difficult	47	23	18	38	64	77	27	37	25	54	58	45	43	29	60	36	48	70	44
	Never Try	20	0	1	17	4	8	1	45	13	5	1	22	1	3	1	15	8	2	9
	Don't Know	1	0	4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	0	2	1	1	14	2	1	1	2
Help from the police when you need it	Easy / Very Easy	16	58	42	25	25	46	29	46	27	43	38	19	32	40	34	30	27	42	34
	Difficult / Very Difficult	44	41	38	41	65	45	27	23	31	39	54	51	45	49	60	46	60	53	45
	Never Try	39	2	15	30	8	8	42	31	37	13	7	29	18	8	1	23	12	4	18
	Don't Know	1	0	6	5	2	1	2	1	5	5	1	1	5	3	5	1	1	1	3
Household services (like piped water, electricity or telephone)	Easy / Very Easy	15	55	50	21	17	13	14	32	26	24	33	23	35	58	24	10	17	27	27
	Difficult / Very Difficult	44	41	34	52	59	51	29	34	36	44	59	49	51	33	69	46	57	50	47
	Never Try	40	3	11	23	17	36	55	33	35	22	6	26	11	7	0	42	23	13	22
	Don't Know	2	1	5	4	7	1	2	1	3	10	2	2	4	3	6	2	4	9	4

<sup>12</sup> This set of questions was introduced in Round 2.

### 3.4. Local Government Performance

For the first time in Round 3, we asked about the performance not just of the national government, but of local governments as well. Local governments are closer to, and hence, at least in principle, more connected to, the populace than national governments. Advocates of decentralization argue that local institutions should therefore be more responsive to citizen demands, and, in theory, this should lead to better performance. Are these hypothetical advantages reflected in ratings of local government performance?

Not really. **On the whole, local governments get at best only fair reviews.** A plurality (48%) thinks they are doing a good job of collecting local taxes; two-thirds of respondents in Mali and Mozambique think this task has been handled well. But the public is evenly split (47% each) on whether or not local governments are doing an effective job of keeping their communities clean, and a majority (53%) feels they are doing a poor job when it comes to road maintenance. With regard to what might be seen as their most important – and sensitive – role, deciding how to spend local revenues, the public is fairly ambivalent. A plurality (38%) thinks they are doing a poor job, but nearly one-third (30%) argues that they’re doing a good job, and another third (32%) simply does not know what to think.

**Close proximity apparently does not necessarily translate into greater public awareness of the goings-on in the local halls of government.** It is again apparent that Lesotho’s local government institutions are still bit players in the daily lives of the public: 70% or more don’t know anything about how local revenues are collected or spent. It is possible that in such a small country, there can be such a thing as government that is “too local,” i.e., too small (and under-resourced) to be of any importance. Whatever the reason, the central government is clearly still the focus of the average Mosotho’s attention. Majorities in Cape Verde and Tanzania are also in the dark regarding the spending of local government revenues.

Zambians and Zimbabweans are consistently the least impressed with the performance of their local governments. In contrast, across these four sectors local governments win their highest average ratings (not shown) in Namibia, Mozambique and Madagascar.

**Table 3.4: Local Government Performance**

How well or badly would you say your local government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? <sup>13</sup>		BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
Maintaining our roads	Fairly / Very well	34	52	57	46	32	34	54	49	38	56	67	29	37	42	49	56	15	22	43
	Fairly / Very badly	64	47	33	51	64	37	44	46	56	40	31	70	57	57	44	43	83	78	53
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	3	1	10	3	3	30	1	5	6	4	2	1	6	2	7	1	2	0	5
Keeping our community clean	Fairly / Very well	40	63	61	49	34	26	67	37	51	61	65	33	40	47	59	59	21	30	47
	Fairly / Very badly	56	35	30	48	57	43	32	54	45	35	34	67	53	50	32	40	77	67	47
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	4	1	10	3	9	31	2	9	4	4	1	1	8	3	9	2	2	2	6
Collecting local taxes	Fairly / Very well	42	45	41	60	56	10	56	40	68	66	58	44	48	47	41	54	42	47	48
	Fairly / Very badly	36	21	17	24	23	20	17	30	21	21	26	47	22	26	15	40	38	41	27
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	22	34	42	16	21	70	27	30	11	13	16	8	30	27	44	6	20	12	25
Deciding how to spend local revenue	Fairly / Very well	26	39	26	34	20	8	30	22	40	46	57	27	33	36	28	29	16	14	30
	Fairly / Very badly	45	26	22	38	53	20	23	44	34	28	27	60	28	38	20	56	58	69	38
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	29	35	52	28	26	72	47	34	26	26	16	13	38	26	52	15	26	17	32

<sup>13</sup> Responses reported exclude the 60% in Namibia who do not have local government.

## PART FOUR: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND STATE LEGITIMACY

### 4.1. The Citizen's Right to Freedom

When we ask ordinary Africans what democracy means to them, the most common response concerns some aspect of civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, association, or religion. But how convinced are Africans that these freedoms need to be protected under all circumstances? Are they prepared to throw open the doors to the marketplace of ideas in their societies, even if this includes ideas that they, or the government they may have voted for, dislike, or believe are false? Or are they willing to make trade-offs between protecting the state, or even just “getting things done,” and the exercise of sometimes troublesome freedoms?

**In short, a solid majority supports the full exercise and protection of political freedoms and the rule of law. But there is also a sizeable and consistent minority who are willing to limit civil liberties or suspend the rule of law in order to serve other ends.** This is evident, first of all, from responses to questions asking whether a government has the right to ban organizations that go against it, close newspapers that print misinformation, or limit the free expression of radical or fringe ideas. Support is shakiest for freedom of the press: a relatively narrow majority (55%) says that “The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit, without fear of being shut down.” A mere third of respondents in Tanzania (31%), Benin (34%), and Senegal (37%) support press freedom. In sharp contrast, in Zimbabwe, where press freedoms are sharply constrained at the moment, nearly eight out of ten (78%) think papers should be free to publish. **Governments' frequent claims that they must limit press freedom in the interests of protecting the public's “right to the truth” may find an easy foothold in many countries.**

**Support is more solid for freedom of association:** 60% reject a government's right to ban organizations that make it uncomfortable. Again, freedom of association receives its strongest support in the country where it faces the gravest threats: a resounding 85% of Zimbabweans deny the state the right to constrain the civic sphere. Tanzanians, on the other hand, are well out of step with their counterparts elsewhere; a mere 23% supporting full freedom of association, and this is a minority position in Mali as well (41%). Majorities – albeit very slim ones in several cases – support unfettered freedom of association in all of the other countries except Mozambique, which comes in at 49%.

**Support is strongest for protecting individuals' right to free expression.** Nearly three out of four respondents (71%) believe that individuals should be free to speak their minds regardless of how unpopular, anti-government or out-of-the-mainstream their views might be. This view is held by 70% or more in 13 of 18 countries, and by 60% or more in all but two. Tanzanians again reveal surprisingly little commitment to this ideal. A plurality of 44% supports a government right to limit free expression, as opposed to 43% who would oppose such efforts.

**Commitment to preserving the rule of law is stronger.** Fully 80% insist that their governments and others must always follow the law, rather than ignoring it when necessary in pursuit of more expedient solutions. Support for this position is relatively strong across all countries, ranging from a low of 60% in Namibia, to a high of 92% in Mali.

Presidents, however, are offered somewhat more leeway. When asked whether they must always be bound by the laws and the courts, support for the rule of law drops to two-thirds (67%), with one-quarter of respondents allowing that the president could ignore such strictures if he chooses. Less than half of Mozambicans and Namibians (47% each) think their presidents should always obey the law, in contrast to 81% of Beninois, who offer no such leeway.

**Table 4.1: The Citizen's Right to Freedoms and the Rule of Law**

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B (percent agree / strongly agree)	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
A. Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies.	26	25	13	28	39	27	16	54	42	37	42	45	24	28	63	38	26	13	32
B. We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it.	67	71	71	67	52	72	71	41	56	49	53	50	69	61	23	58	64	85	60
Do not agree with either	3	3	4	2	6	1	2	2	1	4	3	4	2	6	5	2	8	1	3
Don't know	4	2	13	3	3	1	11	2	1	10	2	1	5	5	9	1	3	1	4
A. Government should close newspapers that print false stories or misinformation.	60	25	21	36	38	36	35	47	55	20	42	35	49	28	54	41	29	20	37
B. The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down.	34	71	60	55	50	62	51	50	41	67	52	61	37	62	31	56	63	78	55
Do not agree with either	1	3	8	2	6	1	3	1	2	3	3	3	7	5	5	2	6	2	4
Don't know	5	1	11	6	5	1	11	2	2	10	2	2	6	5	10	1	2	1	5
A. Government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority.	25	16	14	18	20	16	14	29	38	34	34	25	23	20	44	25	15	11	23
B. People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.	73	82	72	79	76	83	73	69	60	55	63	73	70	73	43	73	81	87	71
Do not agree with either	1	1	4	1	2	1	2	1	1	3	2	2	2	3	4	2	3	1	2
Don't know	2	1	10	2	2	0	10	2	1	8	1	1	5	4	8	0	1	0	3
A. It is better to find lawful solutions to problems even if it takes longer.	83	87	88	91	85	88	61	72	92	79	60	75	87	77	83	88	77	66	80
B. It is sometimes better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately using other means.	13	11	8	7	12	11	31	26	8	14	36	22	11	17	11	10	19	33	17
Do not agree with either	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	0	2	4	2	1	4	3	1	3	1	2
Don't know	3	1	4	1	1	0	6	1	0	6	1	1	2	2	3	0	0	0	2
A. Since the President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong. <sup>14</sup>	13	22	19	21	23	29	17	31	30	34	46	23	22	26	24	22	23	15	24
B. The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong.	81	73	60	74	69	67	69	64	68	47	47	73	70	59	64	76	67	82	67
Do not agree with either	2	3	6	2	5	3	4	3	2	6	4	3	3	9	4	1	8	2	4
Don't know	4	2	15	4	3	1	10	2	1	13	4	2	5	6	8	1	3	1	5

<sup>14</sup> On this question, and others in these tables that refer to "the president," the question in Lesotho referred to the Prime Minister.



## 4.2. The State's Right to Rule

We have seen that, with notable exceptions, Africans are keen to protect individual rights and preserve the rule of law. Do they also assume the responsibilities incumbent upon citizens in a democratic society? Do they accept that their elected governments have a legitimate right to rule them? How legitimate are these African states in the eyes of their publics?

**It appears that the legitimacy of the state does not face serious challenges in most countries.**

A resounding 87% agree that citizens must obey the government in power regardless of who they voted for, and support for this position is strong – at 80% or more – across all but one country. Even in Namibia, a solid majority of two-thirds (68%) agrees. But the sizeable minority (30%) of respondents who believe that they do not necessarily have to obey the laws of a government they did not vote for could generate some trouble if they were to follow through on this position.

**Solid majorities agree that courts have the right to make binding decisions (71%), that police have the right to enforce the law (73%), and to a slightly lesser extent, that the tax department has the right to collect its revenues (63%).** Zimbabweans and Malawians are the least convinced of the courts' rights, with 27% and 28%, respectively, rejecting this position. The rights of police to enforce the law face their largest challenges in Benin (21%), Kenya (20%) and Nigeria (20%). In the latter two countries, the lack of legitimacy likely reflects the fact that Kenyans and Nigerians identified some of the highest levels of perceived and experienced corruption at the hands of police officers.

Finally, **tax collectors appear to be the least legitimate arm of the state, though most still acknowledge the need to acquiesce to their demands for revenue.** Malawi is a startling exception: 46% reject the right of the tax department to make people pay taxes, compared to just 40% who are willing to be more obedient. While Malawians do not appear to be challenging the legitimacy of the state in other respects, there is clearly some deep-seated resentment in the country about misuse of revenues or related concerns. The Malawian government could face serious problems if these citizens were to follow through on their implicit threat to boycott the tax system. Respondents in Benin also raise more doubts than others, with 28% rejecting the legitimacy of the tax department's efforts.

**Table 4.2: The State's Right to Rule**

	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean	
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B (percent agree / strongly agree)																				
A. It is important to obey the government in power no matter who you voted for.	96	90	86	95	93	91	90	80	94	81	68	81	88	80	91	91	87	84	87	
B. It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for.	3	9	8	4	6	8	5	18	5	12	30	17	8	12	5	9	10	15	10	
Do not agree with either	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	2	1	1	1	5	1	0	3	1	1	
Don't know	0	1	5	0	0	0	3	1	0	5	0	1	3	4	2	0	0	0	1	
For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree, or agree? <sup>15</sup>																				
The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by.	59	74	78	78	69	82	59	63	70	68	69	71	70	72	79	81	74	63	71	
Agree / strongly agree																				
Neither agree nor disagree	13	11	6	4	11	2	19	2	10	8	23	12	7	14	5	6	9	5	9	
Disagree / strongly disagree	18	10	9	14	14	12	15	28	17	11	6	16	12	9	7	9	16	27	14	
Don't know	10	4	7	5	7	4	8	6	2	12	2	2	11	5	9	4	1	5	6	
The police always have the right to make people obey the law.	60	69	71	90	67	88	67	74	84	72	68	60	83	67	69	81	72	75	73	
Agree / strongly agree																				
Neither agree nor disagree	12	10	8	2	11	2	18	3	6	8	20	16	3	15	6	5	10	5	9	
Disagree / strongly disagree	21	19	16	7	20	8	13	19	9	10	10	22	6	15	18	13	17	18	14	
Don't know	7	2	6	2	3	2	2	5	1	10	2	2	8	3	8	1	1	2	4	
The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes.	51	64	66	85	59	61	56	40	72	65	62	62	70	59	59	71	66	64	63	
Agree / strongly agree																				
Neither agree nor disagree	13	11	9	4	9	5	20	3	7	7	22	17	6	18	5	8	11	7	10	
Disagree / strongly disagree	28	16	13	7	18	15	14	46	20	11	8	17	13	12	18	17	16	22	17	
Don't know	9	9	12	4	14	20	10	10	2	17	8	4	11	11	17	4	7	8	10	

<sup>15</sup> This set of questions was introduced in Round 2.

### 4.3. Equal Before the Law?

Effective, equitable and predictable implementation of the rule of law is another hallmark of effective state-society relations in a successful democracy. We can ask, for example, whether the state deals with all citizens in a fair and evenhanded manner, or whether it instead favors the powerful over the powerless? Do citizens find that the application of the law is predictable, or arbitrary?

**The public has considerable confidence in the state's ability to capture and punish ordinary citizens who commit serious crimes:** fully 90% think they would be brought to justice if they were to commit such an act. Only a slim majority (53%), however, feels that a top government official would be brought to book under the same circumstances. **Africans perceive that the law still does not apply to the powerful.**

The same pattern holds when respondents were asked about someone who “did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned.” Eighty-seven percent think an ordinary person committing such a crime would be captured and punished – suggesting **considerable confidence in the state's ability to enforce the law**. But just 51% think that a top government official would face the full brunt of the law. **The public is not yet confident that leaders are willing to hold themselves accountable** by applying the same standards to their privileged colleagues as to the man on the street.

**Some gap in expected enforcement exists in all countries, but the variation across countries is remarkable.** In Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Benin, the gap between anticipated enforcement for ordinary citizens and that for top government officials is 60 points or more, and it is nearly this high in Zambia. Thus, 97% of Zimbabweans and 95% of Kenyans think the government would enforce the law against them or some other ordinary citizen if they committed a serious crime. But only 25% and 27%, respectively, believe that a top government official would be brought to justice in the same circumstances. It would appear that **the implementation of state power in these countries is still particularly arbitrary and uneven.**

In Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, on the other hand, the gap is 20 points or less. Eighty percent of South Africans and 78% of Mozambicans think that an ordinary citizen who commits a serious crime will face the full force of the law – thus exhibiting somewhat less confidence in state *capacity* to enforce the law. But 64% and 61%, respectively, think that top government officials would face the same outcome, showing considerably greater confidence that the country's laws apply to all citizens equally, regardless of individual status. Thus, while they still have considerable room for improvement, **these states are far closer to achieving the goal of accountability and predictability in enforcement of the rule of law.**

**Table 4.3: Equal Before the Law?**

How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if:	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
A top government official committed a serious crime	Likely / Very likely	59	65	71	27	72	59	65	48	61	55	45	58	64	58	54	35	25	53
	Not very likely / Not at all likely	65	37	24	65	25	37	32	50	29	41	50	36	32	33	42	62	73	42
	Don't Know	9	4	11	6	8	4	4	3	10	4	5	6	5	9	4	3	2	5
A person like you committed a serious crime	Likely / Very likely	89	94	93	94	97	96	89	94	78	74	78	92	80	91	95	95	97	90
	Not very likely / Not at all likely	6	3	3	3	3	3	9	5	14	24	20	4	16	4	4	5	3	7
	Don't Know	5	3	4	3	2	1	2	1	8	2	3	4	4	5	1	1	0	3
A top official did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned	Likely / Very likely	25	61	63	70	68	54	62	46	59	58	44	55	60	58	51	35	25	51
	Not very likely / Not at all likely	66	34	24	63	24	40	34	51	30	36	50	38	31	32	46	60	73	42
	Don't Know	9	6	13	5	8	6	4	3	11	6	6	7	9	10	4	5	2	7
A person like you did not pay tax on some of the income they earned	Likely / Very likely	88	91	89	94	92	92	85	89	72	78	72	91	72	89	93	91	94	87
	Not very likely / Not at all likely	6	4	4	4	3	5	12	10	19	19	23	4	20	4	6	6	4	9
	Don't Know	5	5	8	3	4	3	4	1	9	3	5	5	8	6	1	3	1	4

## PART FIVE: CORRUPTION AND STATE LEGITIMACY

### 5.1 Defining Corruption

It is sometimes argued that corruption is a cultural concept that has different meanings in different societies. Some contend that the international community may be defining as corrupt actions that merely reflect normal cultural practices of “gift giving” in Africa. Before looking at public ratings of the extent of corruption, it is therefore useful to take a brief look at how Africans define corrupt practices. We asked respondents about three different potential acts by government officials, and whether they considered the acts “not wrong at all,” “wrong but understandable,” or “wrong and punishable.”

**Citizens roundly reject all three practices.** They are most willing to tolerate a public official who “decides to locate a development project in an area where his friends and supporters lived.” Thirteen percent say such actions are permissible, and another 24% think they are wrong, but understandable. Nonetheless, a solid majority of 61% finds such behavior not just wrong, but punishable.

Respondents are even less accepting of a public official who “gives a job to someone from his family who does not have adequate qualifications”: three-quarters (75%) consider this a punishable action. And Africans take an equally dim view of officials’ demands for “a favour or an additional payment for some service that is part of his job.” Clearly, **traditional cultural practices, whether of gift giving or other varieties, do not, in the eyes of the public, entitle government officials to take advantage of them.**

**But interesting cross-country variations in understandings of corruption do arise.** Most notable is the high degree of tolerance in Madagascar and Uganda for the practice of locating development projects in areas that favor the friends and supporters of particular public officials, rather than distributing such projects equitably to the entire community. A plurality (38%) in Madagascar finds such behavior to be completely acceptable, and another third (31%) find it wrong but understandable; only 23% think this is a punishable crime. In Uganda, the populace is nearly evenly split between the three options. But in all other countries, majorities – albeit slim ones in several cases – find this a punishable act. And in Malawi, fully 88% reject such behavior. Thus, **in this case there may be some basis for the idea that “corruption” is indeed a culturally-determined concept.**

**But for the other two behaviors, this is not the case.** For both, majorities in every country, often large ones, reject the act as punishable. Once again, citizens of Madagascar are most tolerant, with a slim majority of 53% rejecting nepotism as a punishable act, while one-third (34%) find this wrong but understandable. And Cape Verdians are also somewhat less convinced of the criminality of such behavior. Just 57% identify it as punishable, compared to 30% who find it wrong but understandable. But two-thirds or more soundly reject it in all other countries except Uganda (63%), and more than 90% of Batswana, South Africans and Zimbabweans find it completely unacceptable.

Demands for favors or bribes are also rejected by solid majorities in all countries, although again the margin is slimmer in Madagascar, as well as Namibia, where 58% reject this behavior but nearly one-third (30%) finds it “wrong but understandable.” A resounding 95% of Zimbabweans would like to see such officials punished. It appears that the political and economic hardships experienced by Zimbabweans in the last few years have made them particularly sensitive to the potential abuses of public officials.

**Table 5.1: Defining Corruption**

	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
For each of the following, please indicate whether you think the act is not wrong at all, wrong but understandable, or wrong and punishable.	11	5	15	10	16	6	38	3	18	10	13	14	8	3	7	31	13	5	13
	17	13	26	18	26	18	35	9	27	22	30	33	18	12	34	35	33	19	24
	68	79	52	70	55	75	23	88	54	57	52	51	71	82	55	34	54	76	61
	4	3	7	2	2	1	4	1	1	12	5	2	3	4	5	0	0	0	3
A public official decides to locate a development project in an area where his friends and supporters lived	5	1	8	2	6	3	9	4	9	5	6	6	3	1	4	7	3	0	5
	21	4	30	12	21	9	34	8	16	21	20	25	12	6	23	29	26	8	18
	73	93	57	85	72	88	53	87	74	67	73	68	83	91	70	63	71	92	75
	2	2	5	2	1	1	4	1	1	7	1	1	3	1	4	0	0	0	2
A government official gives a job to someone from his family who does not have adequate qualifications	1	7	9	2	3	1	9	6	8	5	9	7	1	1	1	8	8	1	5
	15	11	15	9	11	8	30	5	20	18	30	25	8	8	21	29	22	4	16
	82	79	71	87	84	89	58	88	72	70	58	66	88	88	73	62	69	95	77
	2	3	6	2	2	1	3	2	1	7	4	2	3	3	5	1	1	0	3
A government official demands a favour or an additional payment for some service that is part of his job	1	7	9	2	3	1	9	6	8	5	9	7	1	1	1	8	8	1	5
	15	11	15	9	11	8	30	5	20	18	30	25	8	8	21	29	22	4	16
	82	79	71	87	84	89	58	88	72	70	58	66	88	88	73	62	69	95	77
	2	3	6	2	2	1	3	2	1	7	4	2	3	3	5	1	1	0	3

## 5.2. Perceptions of Corruption

Although ordinary Africans do not tend to place as high a priority on reducing corruption as the international community (it does not even make the top ten among the “most important problems” identified by respondents in Round 3), perceptions of corruption can have a powerful impact on the relationship between citizens and the state. Afrobarometer findings have consistently shown that **high levels of perceived corruption have a strong negative effect on trust in state institutions, and consequently on state legitimacy.**

This does not bode well for many of the states included in the Afrobarometer, because **the public perceives widespread corruption among public officials.** Across eight categories of public official, an average of nearly one in three (30%) believes that “most” or “all of them” engage in corrupt behavior. **The police fare the worst**, with a plurality of 45% saying that most or all of them are corrupt. This is more than twice the number who think that corruption is widespread in the Office of the President (22%). Tax departments are also seen as hotbeds of corruption (35%), followed by national and local government officials (30% and 29%, respectively). Elected MPs and local councilors, along with judges and magistrates, are perceived as corrupt by about one-quarter (25%, 27% and 28%, respectively) of respondents.

**There are notable cross-country variations in perceived levels of corruption.** Nigerians, Cape Verdians and Zimbabweans all report high levels of perceived corruption in the Office of the President (54%, 43% and 42%, respectively), in sharp contrast to Cape Verde, Lesotho, Mozambique and Tanzania, where less than 10% think this is a problem. Kenyans join Nigerians, Cape Verdians and Zimbabweans in expressing a high level of concern about the integrity of their MPs, while South Africans are particularly concerned about problems at the local government level, with 44% saying that elected local government councilors are misbehaving, and 45% saying the same of local government officials.

More than 60% of Kenyans, Ugandans, Zambians and Zimbabweans think that most or all of their police are corrupt, and the number leaps to 75% in Nigeria. This compares to just 7% of Cape Verdians. Ugandans are particularly concerned about tax officials (60%), as are Malians (58%) and especially Beninois (72%). Benin (58%) and Mali (56%) are also particularly critical of the behavior of their judges and magistrates, surpassing even Nigerians in their negative perceptions of the legal community.

Overall, on the positive end, **Cape Verdians show the greatest confidence in the general integrity of their leaders.** Less than 10% think that corruption is widespread among any of these groups, and the average across eight categories is just 8%. Basotho (average of 14%), Tanzanians (15%), Mozambicans and Madagascans (17% each) also consistently give their leadership institutions relatively positive reviews. **In contrast, in Nigeria more than half think a majority of officials are corrupt in all sectors except the courts** (8-item average of 57%). They are followed by Beninois (average of 51%), while Zimbabwe (45%) comes in a somewhat distant third. While we noted earlier that Zimbabweans were less inclined than others to conclude that teachers and health workers are corrupt, they are clearly much more critical of their political leadership.

**Table 5.2: Perceptions of Corruption**

How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? <sup>16</sup>		BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
The President and officials in his office	None / Some of them	34	65	24	60	59	64	65	49	56	64	66	42	48	67	50	52	55	50	54
	Most / All of them	43	15	9	16	26	6	11	19	25	10	22	54	19	22	5	25	31	42	22
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	23	20	67	24	16	29	23	32	18	26	12	3	33	11	45	22	14	8	24
Members of Parliament	None / Some of them	32	63	25	60	49	62	65	48	50	64	62	38	45	58	50	57	53	55	52
	Most / All of them	43	20	8	16	40	11	15	22	31	11	27	59	20	26	8	25	38	40	25
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	25	17	67	24	11	27	20	30	19	26	11	4	35	16	42	18	9	6	23
Elected local government councillors	None / Some of them	42	66	26	61	52	59	73	51	55	59	60	40	46	47	53	55	56	47	53
	Most / All of them	39	17	9	19	38	8	12	15	35	11	29	57	22	44	10	34	35	49	27
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	19	17	66	20	11	33	16	33	10	30	11	3	32	9	37	11	9	4	21
National government officials	None / Some of them	28	58	30	52	52	52	60	45	48	59	57	38	45	54	50	50	51	47	49
	Most / All of them	50	29	7	26	33	19	11	25	35	19	35	59	22	36	9	36	36	49	30
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	22	13	63	23	15	29	30	30	17	21	9	3	34	10	41	14	13	4	22
Local government officials	None / Some of them	31	60	29	52	51	47	64	47	51	56	57	39	44	47	55	53	49	48	49
	Most / All of them	41	27	8	26	37	5	13	23	36	18	34	58	19	45	11	38	40	49	29
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	28	13	63	21	12	48	23	30	13	26	9	3	36	8	35	10	11	4	22
Police	None / Some of them	26	59	29	36	30	52	57	45	36	53	52	23	43	46	46	28	27	36	40
	Most / All of them	58	30	7	52	64	35	31	28	50	31	44	75	27	48	34	67	70	62	45
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	17	12	64	12	7	13	12	27	13	16	4	2	29	5	20	5	3	2	15
Tax Officials (e.g., national revenue authority official or local government tax collectors)	None / Some of them	13	58	27	48	43	42	59	45	31	53	51	39	40	51	46	31	36	41	42
	Most / All of them	72	20	7	34	35	14	20	23	58	20	37	56	30	22	20	60	50	44	35
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	15	22	66	18	22	44	22	32	12	27	13	5	30	26	34	10	14	14	24
Judges and magistrates	None / Some of them	24	66	28	47	57	64	56	51	34	58	53	56	45	62	47	51	62	64	51
	Most / All of them	58	14	5	36	28	11	25	20	56	16	32	41	22	22	25	35	31	25	28
	Don't Know / Haven't heard enough	18	20	67	17	15	24	19	29	10	26	15	4	32	16	28	14	7	12	21

<sup>16</sup> This series of questions on corruption was asked in Round 2, and in some countries in Round 1. See for example Section 3.2 in Working Paper No. 60.



### 5.3. Experiencing Corruption

What underlies these perceptions of high levels of corruption, especially with respect to the police? Is it respondents' personal experiences with these individuals and institutions? Or are their views perhaps formed in response to other factors, such as increasing media coverage of this issue in recent years?

We asked respondents about their own personal experiences of corrupt practices as they go about their daily lives. In fact, we find that **far fewer people actually experienced corruption over the past year than perceived corruption in government**, but the experience of corruption is still very high by international standards (and note that we only asked about victimization in the past year; the total number who have experienced corruption *at some time* is sure to be much higher). In the past year, 12% of respondents had to use bribery or its equivalent to get a document or permit or to obtain medicines or medical treatment, and 11% did so to avoid a problem with the police. Fewer resorted to these tactics to get a school placement for a child or to secure access to household services (7% each). Sixty percent or more had never had to pay bribes for any of these things, and the remainder either did not know or had not tried to obtain the relevant service in the past year. Note that if we exclude those who did not try to obtain the service, the rates of corruption experienced by those who did seek it are slightly higher: 17% for obtaining a document or permit, 15% for both getting medical attention and avoiding problems with the police, 11% for obtaining household services, and 10% for getting a school placement for a child.

**Kenyans and Nigerians experience the most corruption.** Nearly one in three Kenyans (29%) had to take extraordinary measures to avoid problems with the police in the past year, as did 22 percent of Nigerians, and 21% of Zimbabweans. Kenyans (25%) and Nigerians (21%) also faced frequent demands for payments in their efforts to obtain health care, joined by Ugandans (29%) and Mozambicans (25%). And when it comes to obtaining documents and permits, the Beninois (22%), Mozambicans (19%) and Senegalese (18%) join the mainstays (Kenya, 25% and Nigeria 20%). Nigerians are, however, the only ones who faced particularly frequent problems in obtaining school placements or household services (17% and 22%, respectively).

**Corruption is least rampant in three Southern African countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi), along with Cape Verde.** Across the five service sectors, an average of just 1% of Botswana were forced to engage in bribery to meet their needs, as were just 2% of Cape Verdians, and 3% of Basotho and Malawians. In all, the five-sector average is under 10% in nine of 18 countries.

There are, however, **some notable differences between perceptions and experiences of corruption across these countries.** If we compare the rank order of each country with respect to its average level of perceived corruption and its average level of experienced corruption (numbers not shown), we find that Nigerians appear to be clearly in touch with their own situation – they rank first on both indices. But there is a significant gap in a number of other countries. Mozambicans, for example, reported one of the lowest levels of perceived corruption, ranking 17<sup>th</sup>, but the country ranks 3<sup>rd</sup> when it comes to experiences of corruption. Kenyans also experience corruption at higher rates (ranking 2<sup>nd</sup>) than might be assumed based on the reported levels of perceived corruption (ranking 7<sup>th</sup>). On the other hand, Malians perceive high levels of corruption (4<sup>th</sup> highest), but their actual experiences place them 13<sup>th</sup>. **This suggests that perceptions of corruption are shaped by other factors in addition to personal experiences**, probably including politicians' promises of reform, second hand accounts of victimization from friends and family, and especially by news media coverage of corruption scandals.

**Table 5.3: Experiencing Corruption**

	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to <sup>17</sup> permit?	75	86	77	39	46	59	56	73	65	58	58	41	59	56	57	53	71	66	61
	11	2	2	8	13	5	8	2	6	9	7	12	9	3	4	10	11	10	7
	11	0	3	7	12	1	5	1	4	10	5	8	9	4	2	6	2	7	5
	4	12	18	47	29	35	31	25	25	23	31	39	23	37	37	31	16	18	27
Get a child into school	87	86	73	52	61	76	61	76	65	63	57	45	67	60	65	65	75	72	67
	4	1	1	6	5	1	2	2	4	7	8	10	3	2	3	7	7	4	4
	4	0	1	5	3	0	2	1	2	9	5	7	2	2	2	3	1	2	3
	6	13	26	37	30	23	34	21	29	21	29	38	28	36	30	25	17	22	26
Get a household service (like piped water, electricity or phone)	83	86	67	45	50	52	31	75	52	56	55	44	64	59	63	52	76	78	60
	4	1	1	5	7	1	2	2	2	5	9	12	4	4	2	3	3	5	4
	4	0	2	8	4	0	1	1	2	7	7	10	4	3	2	2	2	2	3
	9	13	30	42	39	47	66	23	45	32	29	35	28	35	33	43	20	16	32
Get medicine or medical attention from a health worker	87	88	82	57	60	85	67	79	72	61	55	48	71	62	67	56	79	82	70
	6	1	1	6	15	1	6	2	5	8	10	13	2	3	7	12	8	7	6
	6	0	1	5	12	1	7	2	6	17	8	8	5	3	8	17	3	6	6
	1	11	17	32	14	14	21	17	17	15	27	30	22	31	19	16	10	5	18
Avoid a problem with the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest)	88	86	70	45	47	64	39	75	60	60	57	45	64	56	58	54	73	70	62
	3	1	0	5	11	2	3	1	3	6	6	10	2	5	5	9	9	11	5
	3	0	0	10	18	1	4	1	3	11	6	12	4	5	4	9	4	10	6
	5	13	30	40	24	33	55	23	34	23	31	33	31	34	33	29	15	8	27

<sup>17</sup> This set of questions was introduced in Round 2.

#### 5.4. Fighting Back?

Finally, we come to the question of **how African citizens will respond when they encounter situations of incompetence or abuse of power on the part of the state**. Would they fight back, trying to right the wrong? Or would they acquiesce, letting the state continue to get away with mismanagement and abuse of the public trust? Are they, in fact, willing to behave as active and watchful *citizens*, or are they more inclined to yield to the state's misdeeds, rendering themselves mere passive *subjects* of a still all-powerful state?

We asked respondents how they would respond to five hypothetical situations: a) facing delays in receiving a government permit or license; b) finding your name left off the voters list; c) suspecting a school or clinic official of stealing; d) a wrongful arrest of a family member; and e) illegal seizure of your family's land. Respondents' open-ended responses were coded into a number of broad categories.

**In the face of state failures, Africans are least likely to rely simply on patience**, hoping that a situation will work itself out. If they were waiting for a permit that was not coming through, just 14% say they "Won't worry, things will be resolved given enough time." **Another 30% will, as we characterize it, acquiesce in one way or another to the state's mismanagement**: 13% will "Do nothing, because nothing can be done," while 8% will "offer a tip or bribe" and another 9% will "use connections to influential people." We characterize all of these responses as acquiescence because, in one way or another, they all accept the failures of the state system to function as it should, and either give-up, or try to circumvent the system. On the other hand, **50% claim that they would try to force the system to function as it should**. Forty-five percent say they would lodge a complaint through proper channels or procedures, while another 5% identified other actions they would take (including "joining a public protest").

**Respondents' inclination to fight rather than acquiesce, or wait, goes up as the stakes for them personally rise**. If their name was left off the voters roll, 26% would acquiesce, while 61% vow to fight. Just 19% would acquiesce to corruption in a school or clinic, while 71% say they would challenge such behavior. Wrongful arrest of a family member would inspire 73% to fight back, while just 21% would acquiesce to such an action. Finally, the critical importance of land to a family's livelihood and survival over the long term is clear: if the family's land is taken wrongly, fully 83% say they would fight against this situation, while just 11% would, in some manner, acquiesce, including a mere 3% who would "do nothing."

**Responses to the most egregious wrongs – wrongful arrest and land seizure – tend to be relatively consistent across countries**: significant majorities would lodge a complaint or take some other action to fight back against such events in every country except Namibia. There, people are more willing to wait it out and hope for the best (though whether this is indicative of more confidence that the system will eventually work, or merely more passivity, is difficult to say) or to acquiesce and try to use connections to powerful people to influence the situation.

With respect to some of the lesser wrongs, though, the responses across countries are more varied. **Francophone respondents (Benin, Madagascar, Mali and Senegal) show the most willingness to wait out their problems, or simply accept that nothing can be done**. Beninois also feel the most pressed to rely on bribery to solve their problems, whereas very few respondents in Botswana, Cape Verde, Malawi or South Africa propose this solution. Malians, Mozambicans and Namibians are most likely to turn to influential intercessors, while Botswana clearly reveal the most confidence that the system can be corrected: they are generally the most likely to rely on lodging complaints through proper channels to see their problems resolved.

**Table 5.4: Fighting Back?**

	BEN	BOT	CVE	GHA	KEN	LES	MAD	MWI	MALI	MOZ	NAM	NIG	SEN	SAF	TAN	UGA	ZAM	ZIM	Mean
What, if anything, would you do to try and resolve each of the following situations? You were waiting for a government permit or license, but kept encountering delays	17	15	10	13	7	12	30	7	33	7	15	10	29	10	6	11	9	5	14
	11	3	12	17	15	25	14	14	16	9	10	17	10	15	9	19	14	11	13
	26	1	2	10	9	10	13	2	9	5	4	6	11	1	6	13	4	19	8
	16	3	8	5	6	2	9	2	22	15	17	9	21	4	3	6	10	7	9
	18	73	54	49	58	45	24	56	15	48	32	48	18	58	52	42	59	54	45
	4	0	6	3	3	0	7	7	4	5	16	5	4	4	11	7	2	3	5
Election officials left your name off the voters roll	16	4	4	4	1	6	16	2	23	5	11	6	10	5	1	6	5	3	7
	17	11	16	20	19	28	10	13	15	9	10	25	13	19	7	23	27	32	18
	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	6	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	13	2	5	1	2	2	8	3	16	16	17	8	13	3	2	3	4	4	7
	35	77	63	68	66	56	55	69	36	48	31	49	45	59	68	58	58	57	55
	11	1	5	4	5	0	7	8	8	4	16	6	6	5	11	8	4	3	6
You suspected a school or clinic official of stealing	8	1	5	1	1	1	8	1	12	4	11	4	6	3	1	3	1	1	4
	20	5	16	4	9	15	15	7	10	10	4	15	7	15	9	16	15	7	11
	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7	2	0	2	1	1	0	1	1
	10	2	7	1	2	2	6	3	15	19	18	9	10	4	3	3	4	3	7
	39	86	56	88	77	76	50	80	50	46	32	59	59	64	62	66	75	83	64
	12	1	6	3	6	1	12	6	11	7	18	6	6	5	9	9	3	5	7
The police wrongly arrested someone in your family	4	1	2	2	1	1	5	1	8	3	11	4	7	3	2	2	2	1	3
	8	4	7	5	5	7	7	5	6	8	8	10	4	12	10	4	6	5	7
	4	0	0	1	12	2	3	0	3	3	6	7	1	1	10	9	1	10	4
	22	2	5	3	5	2	13	3	20	17	18	13	21	4	3	8	11	7	10
	51	89	71	82	72	86	63	82	57	52	32	58	53	70	56	72	77	75	67
	8	1	11	4	3	1	8	5	5	6	20	6	7	4	11	4	2	1	6
Someone wrongly seized your family's land	4	1	1	1	0	0	3	0	3	3	11	4	3	3	1	2	2	0	2
	5	2	4	1	1	1	3	1	2	7	7	7	1	11	2	2	3	4	3
	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	5	2	0	1	1	1	0	2	1
	7	3	4	2	3	2	6	2	13	17	18	13	8	3	2	7	9	7	7
	75	90	78	91	86	96	81	91	78	54	33	65	79	70	81	84	84	85	78
	8	1	9	3	8	1	5	5	3	8	18	6	3	5	8	4	2	2	5

## Appendix 1

### Sample Size and Dates of Fieldwork

	<b>Sample Size</b>	<b>Dates of Fieldwork</b>
Benin	1198	April 22 – May 10, 2005
Botswana	1200	May 28 – June 12, 2005
Cape Verde	1256	March 28 – April 9, 2005
Ghana	1197	March 10 – 21, 2005
Kenya	1278	Sept. 6 – 28, 2005
Lesotho	1161	July 6 – Aug. 13, 2005
Madagascar	1350	May 19 – June 28, 2005
Malawi	1200	June 16 – July 4, 2005
Mali	1244	June 20 – July 7, 2005
Mozambique	1198	June 13 – 26, 2005
Namibia	1200	Feb. 13 – March 7, 2006
Nigeria	2363	Aug. 28 – Dec. 31, 2005
Senegal	1200	Sept. 26 – Oct. 8, 2005
South Africa	2400	Feb. 6 – 28, 2006
Tanzania	1304	July 21 – Aug. 13, 2005
Uganda	2400	April 12 – May 4, 2005
Zambia	1200	July 29 – Aug. 16, 2005
Zimbabwe	1048	Oct. 9 – 28, 2005
TOTAL	25,397	March 10, 2005 – March 7, 2006

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